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Abstract—This paper proposes CAESAR, a novel multi-leader
Generalized Consensus protocol for geographically replicated
sites. The main goal of CAESAR is to overcome one of the
major limitations of existing approaches, which is the significant
performance degradation when application workload produces
conflicting requests. CAESAR does that by changing the way a
fast decision is taken: its ordering protocol does not reject a fast
decision for a client request if a quorum of nodes reply with
different dependency sets for that request. The effectiveness of
CAESAR is demonstrated through an evaluation study performed
on Amazon’s EC2 infrastructure using 5 geo-replicated sites.
CAESAR outperforms other multi-leader (e.g., EPaxos) competi-
tors by as much as 1.7x in the presence of 30% conflicting
requests, and single-leader (e.g., Multi-Paxos) by up to 3.5x.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Geographically replicated (geo-scale) services, namely
those where actors are spread across geographic locations and
operate on the same shared database, can be implemented in an
easy manner by exploiting underlying synchronization mecha-
nisms that provide strong consistency guarantees. These mech-
anisms ultimately rely on implementations of Consensus [1]
to globally agree on sequences of operations to be executed.
Paxos [2], [3] is a popular algorithm for solving Consensus
among participants interconnected by asynchronous networks,
even in presence of faults, and it can be leveraged for building
such robust services [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]. An example of Paxos
used in a production system is Google Spanner [4].
The most deployed version of Paxos is Multi-Paxos [3],
where there is a designated node, the leader, that is elected and
responsible for deciding the order of client-issued commands.
Multi-Paxos solves Consensus in only three communication
delays, but in practice, its performance is tied to the per-
formance of the leader. This relation is risky when Multi-
Paxos is deployed in geo-scale because network delays can
be arbitrarily large and unpredictable. In these settings, the
leader might often be unreachable or slow, thus causing the
slow down of the entire system.
To overcome this limitation, protocols aimed at allowing
multiple nodes to operate as command leaders at the same
time [9], [10], [11] have been proposed. Such solutions provide
implementations of Generalized Consensus [12], a variant of
Consensus that agrees on a common order of non-commutative
(or conflicting) commands. These approaches, despite avoiding
the bottleneck of the single leader, suffer from other costs
whenever a non-trivial amount of conflicting commands (e.g.,
5% – 40%) is proposed concurrently, as they do not rely on
a unique point of decision.
This paper presents the first multi-leader implementation
of Generalized Consensus designed for maintaining high
performance in the presence of both mostly non-conflicting
workloads (named as such if less than 5% of conflicting
commands are issued) and conflicting workloads (where at
most 40% of commands conflict with each other). For this
reason, our solution is apt for geo-scale deployments. More
specifically, state-of-the-art implementations of Generalized
Consensus (e.g., EPaxos [9] and M2Paxos [13]) reduce the
minimum number of communication delays required to reach
an agreement from three to two in case a proposed command
does not encounter any contention (fast decision). However,
they fail in the following aspect: they are not able to minimize
the latency as soon as some contention on issued commands
arises, with the consequence of requiring a slow decision,
which consists of at least four communication delays.
To address these aspects, we propose CAESAR, a consensus
layer that deploys an innovative multi-leader ordering scheme.
As a high-level intuition, when a conflicting command is
proposed, CAESAR does not suffer from the condition that
causes a slow decision of that command in all existing
Generalized Consensus implementations (including EPaxos).
Such a condition is the following:
For a proposed command c, at least two nodes in a quorum
are aware of different sets of commands conflicting with c.
CAESAR avoids this pitfall because it approaches the prob-
lem of establishing agreement from a different perspective.
When a command c is proposed, CAESAR seeks an agreement
on a common delivery timestamp for c rather than on its
set of conflicting commands. To facilitate this, a local wait
condition is deployed to prevent commands conflicting with c
from interfering with the decision process of c if they have a
timestamp greater than c’s timestamp.
The basic idea behind the ordering process of CAESAR
is the following: a command is associated with a logical
timestamp by the sender, and if a quorum of nodes confirms
that the timestamp is still valid, then the command is ordered
after all the conflicting commands having a valid earlier
timestamp. Otherwise, the timestamp is considered invalid,
and the command is rejected forcing it to undergo two more
communication delays (total of four) before being decided.
Note that the equality of the sets of conflicting commands
collected by nodes does not influence the ordering decision.
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With this scheme, CAESAR boosts timestamp-based ordering
protocols, such as Mencius [10], by exploiting quorums, which
is a fundamental requirement in geo-scale where contacting all
nodes is not feasible. CAESAR does that without relying on a
single designated leader unlike Multi-Paxos.
Our approach also provides the benefit of a more parallel
delivery of ordered commands when compared to EPaxos,
which requires analysis of the dependency graphs. That is
because once the delivery timestamp for a command is fi-
nalized, the command implicitly carries with itself the set of
predecessor commands that have to be delivered before it. This
so-called predecessors set is computed during the execution of
the ordering algorithm for the decision of the timestamp and
not after the delivery of the command.
We conducted an evaluation study for CAESAR using key-
value store interfaces. With them, we can inject different
workloads by varying the percentage of conflicting commands
and measure various performance parameters. We contrasted
CAESAR against: EPaxos and M2Paxos, multi-leader quorum-
based Generalized Consensus implementations; Mencius, a
multi-leader timestamp-based Consensus implementation that
does not rely on quorums; and Multi-Paxos, a single-leader
Consensus implementation. As a testbed, we deployed 5 geo-
replicated sites using the Amazon EC2 infrastructure.
The results confirm the effectiveness of CAESAR in pro-
viding fast decisions, even in the presence of conflicting
workloads, while competitors slow down. Using workloads
with a conflict percentage in the range of 2% – 50%, CAESAR
outperforms EPaxos, which is the closest competitor in most
of the cases, by reducing latency up to 60% and increasing
throughput by 1.7×. These performance boosts are due to the
higher percentage of fast decisions accomplished. With 30%
of conflicting workload, CAESAR takes up to 70% fewer slow
decisions compared to EPaxos.
II. RELATED WORK
In the Paxos [3] algorithm, a value is decided after a
minimum of four communication delays. Progress guarantees
cannot be provided as the initial prepare phase may fail in
the presence of multiple concurrent proposals. Multi-Paxos
alleviates this by letting promises in the prepare phase cover
an entire sequence of values. This effectively establishes a
distinguished proposer that acts as a single designated leader.
Fast Paxos [14] eliminates one communication delay by
having proposers broadcast their request and bypass the leader.
However, a classic Paxos round executed by the leader is
needed to resolve a collision, reaching a total of six communi-
cation delays to decide a value. Generalized Paxos [12] relies
on a single leader to detect conflicts among commands and
enforce an order, and it uses fast quorums as Fast Paxos. Some
of its limitations are overcome by FGGC [15], which can use
optimal quorum size but still relies on designated leaders. On
the contrary, CAESAR avoids the usage of a single designated
leader either to reach an agreement, as in Paxos, or to resolve
a conflict, as in Fast and Generalized Paxos.
Mencius [10] overcomes the limitations of a single leader
protocol by providing a multi-leader ordering scheme based
on a pre-assignment of Consensus instances to nodes. It pre-
assigns sending slots to nodes, and a sender can decide the
order of a message at a certain slot s only after hearing from
all nodes about the status of slots that precede s. Clearly
this approach is not able to adopt quorums (unlike Paxos),
and it may result in poor performance in case of slow nodes
or unbalanced inter-node delays. To alleviate the problem of
slow nodes, Fast Mencius has been proposed [16]. It uses
a mechanism that enables the fast nodes to revoke the slots
assigned to the slow nodes. However, Fast Mencius still suffers
from high latency in specific WAN deployments since it does
not rely on quorums for delivering.
EPaxos employs dependency tracking and fast quorums
to deliver non-conflicting commands using a fast path. In
addition, its graph-based dependency linearization mechanism
that is adopted to define the final order of execution of com-
mands may easily suffer from complex dependency patterns.
Instead, Alvin [11] avoids the expensive computation on the
dependency graphs enforced by EPaxos via a slot-centric
decision, but it still suffers from the same vulnerability to
conflicts of EPaxos: a command’s leader is not able to decide
on a fast path if it observes discordant opinions from a quorum
of nodes. That is not the case of CAESAR, whose fast decision
scheme is optimized to increase the probability of deciding in
two communication delays regardless of discordant feedbacks.
M2Paxos [13] is a multi-leader consensus implementation
that provides fast decisions while i) adopting only a major-
ity of nodes as quorum size, and ii) avoiding to exchange
dependencies of commands. It does that by embedding an
ownership acquisition phase for commands into the agreement
process, so as to guarantee that a node having the ownership
on a set of commands can autonomously take decisions on
those commands. However, in case there are multiple nodes
that compete for the decision of non-commutative commands,
the protocol might require an expensive ownership acquisition
phase to re-distribute their ownership records.
CAESAR is also related to Clock-RSM [17]. In Clock-RSM,
each node proposes commands piggybacked with its physical
timestamp, which are then deterministically ordered according
to their associated timestamps. Although Clock-RSM is multi-
leader like CAESAR, and it relies on quorums to implement
replication, it suffers from the same drawbacks of Mencius,
namely the need of a confirmation that no other command
with an earlier timestamp has been concurrently proposed.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a set of nodes Π = {p1, p2, . . . , pN} that
communicate through message passing and do not have access
to either a shared memory or a global clock. Nodes may fail
by crashing but do not behave maliciously. A node that does
not crash is called correct; otherwise, it is faulty. Messages
may experience arbitrarily long (but finite) delays.
Because of FLP [18], we assume that the system can be en-
hanced with the weakest type of unreliable failure detector [19]
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(a) The non-commutative commands c and c¯ are executed only after a
quorum of nodes receives them. A total order of the commands is not
enforced in this case, since commands are submitted “only” via reliable
broadcast.
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(b) The non-commutative commands c and c¯ are executed only after
a quorum of nodes receives them. A total order of the commands is
enforced in this case: c¯ is executed after c on all nodes, since T =
0 < T¯ = 4, and timestamp are received in order by p2.
Fig. 1. Reliable broadcast execution vs. CAESAR execution
that is necessary to implement a leader election service [20].
In addition, we assume that at least a strict majority of nodes,
i.e.,
⌊
N
2
⌋
+ 1, is correct. We name classic quorum (CQ), or
more simply quorum, any subset of Π with size at least equal
to
⌊
N
2
⌋
+ 1. We name fast quorum (FQ) any subset of Π
with size at least equal to
⌈
3N
4
⌉
(derived by minimizing CQ).
As it will be clear in Section V, a fast quorum is required
to achieve fast decisions in two communication delays, while
classic quorum is required in case the protocol needs more
than two communication delays to reach a decision.
We follow the definition of Generalized Consensus [12]:
each node can propose a command c via the PROPOSE(c)
interface, and nodes decide command structures C-struct cs
via the DECIDE(cs) interface. The specification is such that:
commands that are included in decided C-structs must have
been proposed (Non-triviality); if a node decided a C-struct
v at any time, then at all later times it can only decide v • σ,
where σ is a sequence of commands (Stability); if c has been
proposed then c will be eventually decided in some C-struct
(Liveness); and two C-structs decided by two different nodes
are prefixes of the same C-struct (Consistency). Note that the
symbol • is the append operator as defined in [12].
For simplicity of the presentation, we also use the notation
DECIDE(c) for the decision of a command c on a node pi,
with the following semantics: the sequence of k consecutive
calls of DECIDE(c1) • DECIDE(c2) • · · · • DECIDE(ck) on
pi is equivalent to the call of DECIDE(c1 • c2 • · · · • ck).
We say that two commands c and c¯ are non-commutative, or
conflicting, and we write c ∼ c¯, if the results of the execution
of both c and c¯ depend on whether c has been executed before
or after c¯. It is worth noting that, as specified in [12], two C-
structs are still the same if they only differ by a permutation
of non-conflicting commands.
IV. OVERVIEW OF CAESAR
We introduce CAESAR incrementally by starting from a base
protocol, which only provides reliable broadcast of commands,
and then we present the design of the final protocol, which
implements Generalized Consensus. We consider the first
protocol as a reference point to show the minimal costs that are
required to implement our specification of Consensus, and we
explain how CAESAR is able to maximize the probability to
execute with the same number of communication steps as the
reference protocol. Section V provides the details of CAESAR.
A necessary condition for implementing both a reliable
broadcast protocol and the consistency property of CAESAR
is guaranteeing that if a command is delivered to a (correct
or faulty) node, then it is eventually delivered to any correct
node. This is because whenever a command is executed by a
node and the result externalized to clients, the command must
be durable in the system despite crashes.
The base protocol executes as shown in Figure 1(a). When
a client proposes a command c to the system via the interface
PROPOSE(c), the protocol chooses a node to be c’s leader, p0
in this case, which broadcasts a PROPOSE message with c to
all nodes. Afterwards, whenever c’s leader collects a quorum
of OK replies for c, it broadcasts a STABLE message for c in
order to allow all nodes (including the leader itself) to deliver
and execute c (thick arrows in Figure 1(a)).
The base protocol is fault-tolerant because whenever c is
delivered and executed on some node, one of the following
conditions is true, regardless of the crash of f nodes: if
c’s leader does not crash, eventually any other correct node
receives the STABLE message for c; or if c’s leader crashes,
there always exists at least one correct node that received the
PROPOSE message for c, so it can take over the crashed leader
by re-executing the protocol for c. Moreover, the scheme
adopted by the base protocol needs two communication delays:
one for the PROPOSE message and one for the OK messages,
to return the result of an execution to a client. Two com-
munication delays are the minimum required to implement
consensus in an asynchronous system [21].
The base protocol does not implement Generalized Con-
sensus because it does not enforce any order on the deliv-
ery of non-commutative commands. In fact, two concurrent
commands, c and c¯, can be delivered and executed in any
order by different nodes, regardless of their commutativity
relation. CAESAR implements the specification of Generalized
Consensus by building a novel timestamp-based mechanism on
top of the base protocol to enforce a total order among non-
commutative commands. We still rely on Figure 1 for showing
the intuition. Command c is associated with a unique logical
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(a) p2 sends an OK message for c at timestamp T = 0 because c is in the
predecessors set of c¯, and c¯ is decided at timestamp T¯ = 4.
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(b) p2 rejects c at timestamp T = 0 because c is not in the predecessors
set of c¯, and c¯ is decided at timestamp T¯ = 4. c is decided at timestamp 5
after a retry.
Fig. 2. Execution of the wait condition in CAESAR due to out of order reception of non-commutative commands on node p2. Command c waits for command
c¯ to be stable on node p2, since c’s timestamp T has been received after c¯’s timestamp T¯ , and T = 0 < T¯ = 4.
timestamp T (see Section V-A for the timestamp assignment),
and it can be delivered and executed only after a quorum of
nodes confirms that no other command c¯ with timestamp T¯ ,
where c¯ ∼ c and T¯ > T , will be executed before c. Note that
in this section we do not distinguish between fast and classic
quorums, although in Section V we explain that a fast quorum
is required at this stage due to the lower-bound defined in [21].
Here, we assume c’s leader does not fail or is suspected; the
case of faulty leaders is discussed in Section V-E.
Figure 1(b) shows how CAESAR applies this idea to the
execution of Figure 1(a). Node p0 broadcasts c by proposing
it with timestamp 0; then a quorum of nodes confirms c since
none of those nodes has already received c¯ with a timestamp
greater than 0. The confirmation from a process pj is sent via
an OK message, which, unlike the base protocol, includes a
predecessors set Predj of the commands observed by pj , and
that should precede c. When p4 broadcasts c¯ with timestamp 4,
it receives a quorum of replies from p2, p3, p4, which confirms
that c¯ can be executed with timestamp 4 and only after c has
been executed. This happens because p2 already observed c at
the time it received c¯ (see circle in Figure 1(b)), and it included
Pred2 = {c} in the OK message for c¯. A command leader
can broadcast the STABLE message as soon as it receives
a quorum of OK messages for that command, and it also
includes the timestamp and the set Pred, which is the union of
the predecessors sets received in the OK messages. Therefore,
in CAESAR, unlike the base protocol, a node can execute c
when it receives the STABLE message for c and only after it
has executed all the commands in c’s Pred.
As shown in Figure 1(b), a command’s leader in CAESAR
still guarantees a fast decision in two communication delays as
long as the proposed timestamp is confirmed by a quorum of
nodes and despite the non-uniform replies that it collected (the
set of predecessors collected by p4 for c¯ is different). This also
constitutes a significant difference between CAESAR and other
state-of-the-art Generalized Consensus implementations, e.g.,
EPaxos, which require at least two additional communication
delays before the execution of c¯ in the example of Figure 1(b).
In the following we answer two questions: what does a node
do if it observes out of order timestamps (Section IV-A)? How
does a command’s leader behave if one of the nodes in the
replying quorum rejects a proposed timestamp (Section IV-B)?
A. Out of Order Timestamps
Let us now consider the scenario in Figure 2(a), where,
unlike the one in Figure 1, node p2 receives the PROPOSE for
c after having received the one for c¯ (see the circle on p2).
In this case, p2 cannot directly send an OK message for c,
because T = 0 < T¯ = 4, and c¯ could be finally decided at
timestamp T¯ without ever considering c as its predecessor, and
hence be executed before c, with a resulting violation of the
order of the timestamps. On the other hand, sending a rejection
for c would require additional communication delays, because
c’s leader would be forced to retry the decision procedure
with a new timestamp. This overhead is unnecessary if c was
received before c¯ on another node, which could be part of the
quorum of replies to c¯’s leader.
In this case, CAESAR enforces a wait condition for c on p2
(bar labelled wait along p2’s timeline in Figure 2(a)) in order
to prevent the execution of any step for c until p2 receives
the final decision for c¯. Afterwards, if the final decision for c¯
includes c in c¯’s Pred, p2 can reply with anOK message to c’s
leader. As a result, CAESAR is able to increase the probability
of deciding commands in two communication delays even in
the case of out of order reception of timestamps. Note that the
wait condition does not cause deadlock since only commands
with a lower timestamp, e.g., c, wait for the final decision of
conflicting commands with a higher timestamp, e.g., c¯.
B. Rejection of Timestamps
In case a node cannot confirm a timestamp T proposed for
a command c, it sends a rejection NACK to c’s leader, forcing
the leader to retry c with a timestamp greater than T . This is
the case of Figure 2(b), where p2 rejects T = 0 for c because
it already received the STABLE message for c¯ with timestamp
T¯ > T and c is not in c¯’s Pred. p2 also sends back the set of
commands that caused the rejection (i.e., c¯) to aid in choosing
the next timestamp for c.
In CAESAR, if a command’s leader receives at least one
NACK message for the proposed command c, it assigns a
new timestamp Tnew greater than any suggestion received in
the NACK messages, and it broadcasts a RETRY message to
ask for the acceptance of Tnew to a quorum of nodes. Note
that if a node sends a NACK message for a command c to
c’s leader, it means that c’s leader would receive at least a
NACK message for c from any other quorum due to the way
a command rejection is computed (see Section V).
The RETRY message also contains the predecessors set
Pred, which is computed as the union of predecessors re-
ceived in the quorum of replies from the previous phase, as the
case of Section IV-A. Therefore, in Figure 2(b), p0 broadcasts
the RETRY with timestamp Tnew = 5 and Pred = {c¯} for c.
Retrying a command with a new timestamp does not entail
restarting the procedure from the beginning. In fact, unlike
the case of a PROPOSE message, CAESAR guarantees that
a RETRY message can never be rejected (see Sections V-C
and V-F). Such a guarantee ensures starvation-free agreement
of commands. The reply to a RETRY message for c could
contain a set of additional predecessors that were not received
by c’s leader during the previous communication phase. This
set is sent along with the STABLE message for c.
V. PROTOCOL DETAILS
A command c that is proposed to CAESAR can go through
four phases before it gets decided and the outcome of its
execution is returned to the client. CAESAR schedules the
execution of those four phases in order to provide two modes
of decision, called fast decision and slow decision.
A command c is proposed by one of the nodes, which
assumes the role of c’s leader and coordinates the decision
of c by starting the fast proposal phase. If this phase returns a
positive outcome after having collected replies from a quorum
of FQ nodes, the leader can execute the final stable phase,
which finalizes the decision of c as a fast decision, with a
latency of two communication delays. Otherwise, if the fast
proposal phase returns a negative outcome, the leader executes
an additional retry phase, in which it contacts a quorum of CQ
nodes, before issuing the final stable phase. This results in a
slow decision, with a latency of four communication delays.
In this section we describe CAESAR by detailing the re-
quired data structures in Section V-A, the procedure for a fast
decision in Section V-B, the procedure for a slow decision
in Section V-C, and the behavior of the protocol in case of
failures in Section V-E. We also explain how CAESAR behaves
in case a leader is not able to contact a fast quorum of nodes
during the execution of the fast proposal phase for a command,
as long as no more than f nodes crash. This case entails
the execution of an additional slow proposal phase after the
fast proposal phase and before the remaining retry and stable
phases. This part is detailed in Section V-D.
In Figure 4 we provide the main pseudocode of CAESAR
for the decision of a command c. Each horizontal block of
the figure is a phase, and phases are linked through arrows to
indicate the transition from one phase to another. For instance,
in case of fast decision, we have a transition from the fast
proposal phase to the stable phase; on the other hand all the
other transitions are part of a slow decision. Moreover, the
pseudocode is vertically partitioned in order to distinguish the
part that is executed by the command c’s leader and the part
that can be executed by any node (including the leader); it
is also named as acceptor for historical reasons. Finally, the
pseudocodes of auxiliary functions and the recovery from a
failure are provided in Figures 3 and 5, respectively.
A. Data Structures per node pi
T Si. It is a logical clock with monotonically increasing
values in a totally ordered set of elements, and it is used to
generate timestamps for the commands that are proposed by
pi. Its value at a certain time is greater than the timestamp of
any command that has been handled by pi before that time.
We assume that whenever pi sends a command, T Si is
updated with a greater value and used as a timestamp T for the
command. Also, whenever pi receives a command with times-
tamp T , it updates its T Si with a value that is greater than T ,
if T ≥ T Si. We also assume that for any two T Si and T Sj ,
of pi and pj respectively, the value of T Si is different from the
value of T Sj at any time. This is guaranteed by choosing the
values of T Si (T Sj , respectively) in the set {〈k, i〉 : k ∈ N}
({〈k, j〉 : k ∈ N}, respectively). The total order relation on
those values is defined as follows: for any two 〈k1, i〉, 〈k2, j〉,
we have that 〈k1, i〉 < 〈k2, j〉 ⇔ k1 < k2∨(k1 = k2 ∧ i < j).
The initial value of T Si is 〈0, i〉.
Hi. It is the data structure recording the status of
commands seen by pi. It is represented as a map of tuples
of the form 〈c, T ,Pred, status,B, forced〉 where: c is a
command; T is the latest timestamp of c; Pred is the set
of commands that should precede c in the final decision;
status is the current status of c, and it has values in the set
{fast-pending, slow-pending, accepted, rejected, stable};
B is the ballot number associated with this event, and it has
values in N; and forced is a boolean variable with values in
{>,⊥}, and it indicates if the info associated with this event
(e.g., Pred) has been forced by a recovery procedure.
Each tuple in Hi is uniquely identified by the first element
of the tuple, i.e., the command, and thus Hi contains at most
one tuple per command. For a more compact representation,
we use the don’t-care term “−” whenever we are not interested
in the value of a specific element of a tuple.
We also use the following notations: Hi.UPDATE(c, T ,
Pred, status, B, forced) to indicate that the protocol ap-
pends the tuple 〈c, T ,Pred, status,B, forced〉 to Hi, by
first possibly deleting any existing tuple 〈c,−,−,−,−,−〉
from Hi; Hi.GET(c) to indicate that the protocol re-
trieves a tuple associated with the command c in Hi; and
Hi.GETPREDECESSORS(c) to indicate that the protocol re-
trieves the set Pred of a tuple 〈c,−,Pred,−,−,−〉 in Hi.
The initial value of Hi is the empty sequence.
Ballotsi. It is an array mapping commands to ballots, which
have values in N. Ballotsi[c] = B means that B is the current
ballot for which pi has processed an event related to command
c. The initial values of Ballotsi are 0.
B. Fast Decision
A client proposes a command c by triggering the event
PROPOSE(c) on one of the nodes of CAESAR (lines I1–I2),
which becomes c’s leader. Let us call this node pi. pi enters the
fast proposal phase for c by choosing the current value of T Si
as timestamp T ime of c. The other parameters of this phase
are the ballot number Ballot and the whitelist Whitelist
whose values, in this case, are 0 and empty set, respectively.
The meaning of these parameters is strictly related to the
recovery procedure due to node failures, and therefore we will
provide further details in Section V-E. However, at this stage,
it is enough to know that:
- a ballot number for c is an identifier of the current leader
for c, and a node pj receiving a message with ballot number
B can process that message only if its current ballot, i.e.,
Ballotsj [c], for c is not greater than B.
- Whitelist for c contains the commands that should be
considered as predecessors of c according to the perception
of the node that is executing a recovery procedure for c.
Fast proposal phase. The purpose of the fast proposal phase
for a command c with a timestamp T ime is to propose,
to a quorum of nodes, the acceptance of c at T ime and
collect, from that quorum, the known predecessor set Pred of
commands c¯ that should be decided before c at a timestamp
less than T ime. To do so, pi broadcasts a FASTPROPOSE
message with c and T ime, and it collects FASTPROPOSER
messages from a quorum of nodes (lines P1–P2).
When a node pj receives a FASTPROPOSE message with c
and T ime, it computes the predecessor set Predj by calling
the COMPUTEPREDECESSORS function (line P13) and updates
the entry for c in Hj by marking that as fast-pending
with T ime and Predj (line P14), and it calls the function
WAIT (line P15) to check the wait condition, as described
in Section IV-A. pj also stores in Hj whether the value of
Whitelist is different from null or not (line P14).
A FASTPROPOSER message for c from a node pj contains a
timestamp T imej and a predecessor set Predj , and it can be
marked with either OK or NACK. If the message is marked
with OK, then T imej is equal to the proposed T ime, by
meaning that pj did not reject T ime. On the contrary, if
the message is marked with NACK, then T imej is greater
than T ime meaning that pj rejected T ime and suggested a
greater timestamp for c. In both cases, whether T ime has
been rejected or not, the predecessor set Predj contains all
the commands c¯ that should be decided before c according to
the current knowledge of pj .
WAIT (see lines 4–8 of Figure 3) forces c to wait for any
command c¯ in Hj that does not commute with c to be marked
with either accepted or stable, if c¯’s timestamp is greater than
c’s timestamp and c is not in c¯’s predecessor set. Afterwards,
when the wait condition does not hold anymore, WAIT returns
NACK in case there still exists such a command c¯, with status
either accepted or stable; otherwise the function returns OK.
If WAIT returns OK, then pj sends T ime and the computed
Predj back to c’s leader by confirming what the leader
proposed (line P20). Otherwise, if WAIT returns NACK (lines
P16–P20), pj rejects the proposed timestamp by: marking
the tuple of c in Hj as rejected, suggesting the current
value of T Sj as a new timestamp for c, and recomputing
the predecessor set according to the new timestamp.
The predecessor set Predj of c is computed as the set of
1: function Set COMPUTEPREDECESSORS(c, T ime, Whitelist)
2: Predj ← {c¯ : c¯ ∼ c
∧(Whitelist = null⇒ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj : T¯ < T ime)
∧
(Whitelist 6= null⇒ c¯ ∈ Whitelist ∨
∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, slow-pending/accepted/stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hj :
T¯ < T ime) }
3: return Predj
4: function Boolean WAIT(c, T ime)
5: wait until ∀〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ,
(c¯ ∼ c ∧ T ime < T¯ ∧ c 6∈ Pred⇒
∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, accepted/stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hj)
6: if ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, accepted/stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hj :
c¯ ∼ c ∧ T ime < T¯ ∧ c 6∈ Pred then
7: return NACK
8: else return OK
9: function BREAKLOOP(c)
10: 〈c, T ,Pred, stable,B,⊥〉 ← Hj .GET(c)
11: for all c¯ ∈ Pred : 〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, stable,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hj ∧ T¯ < T do
12: Hj .UPDATE(c¯, T¯ , Pred \ {c}, stable, B, ⊥)
13: for all c¯ ∈ Pred : 〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, stable,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hj ∧ T¯ > T do
14: Pred← Pred \ {c¯}
15: Hj .UPDATE(c, T , Pred, stable, B, ⊥)
16: function Boolean DELIVERABLE(c)
17: return (c ∪Hj .GETPREDECESSORS(c)) ⊆ Decidedj
Fig. 3. Auxiliary functions - node pj
commands c¯ in Hj that do not commute with c and have
a timestamp smaller than c’s timestamp, with the following
exception (see lines 1–3 of Figure 3): if the Whitelist in
input is not null and c¯ is not contained in Whitelist, then c¯
has to appear with a status that is different from fast-pending
in Hj in order to be included in Predj .
In case of a fast decision (see FastDecision transition in
Figure 4), the command leader pi is able to collect a fast
quorum of FQ replies that do not reject T ime for c (line
P5). It then submits c with the confirmed T ime and the union
of the received predecessor sets, i.e., Pred, to the next stable
phase (lines P3–P4 and P6).
Note that unlike other multi-leader consensus protocols [12],
[9], a fast decision in CAESAR is guaranteed in case a fast
quorum confirms the timestamp for a command, although
those nodes can reply with non-equal predecessors sets. In the
correctness proof of CAESAR (see Section V-F), we show that
such a condition is sufficient to guarantee the recoverability of
the fast decision for c even in case the command leader and
at most other f − 1 nodes crash.
Stable phase. The purpose of the stable phase for a command
c with a timestamp T ime and predecessor set Pred is to
communicate to all the nodes, via a STABLE message, that c
has to be decided at timestamp T ime after all the commands
in Pred have been decided (line S1). In particular, whenever
a node pj receives a STABLE message for c, with T ime and
set Pred (lines S2–S7), it updates the tuple for c in Hj with
the new values and marks the tuple as stable (line S3).
Whenever each command in Pred has been decided (lines
16–17 of Figure 3), pj can decide c by triggering DECIDE(c)
(lines S5–S7). This is correct because, as we prove in Sec-
tion V-F, the phases executed before the stable phase guarantee
that for any pair of stable and non-commutative commands
c and c¯, with timestamps T ime and T ime respectively, if
Fast Proposal Phase
FastDecision(c, Ballot, Time, Pred)
SlowDecisionFromRetry(c, Ballot, Time, Pred)
SlowDecisionFromProposal(c, Ballot, Time, Pred)
Command Leader
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P1:
P2:
P3:
P4:
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P6:
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I2:
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P22:
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P31:
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P33:
P34:
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P38:
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R4:
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S1:
Acceptors
S2:
S3:
S4:
S5:
S6:
S7:
Algorithm 1 Proposal, Retry, and Stable phases.
1: Propose(c)
2: T ime T Si
3: FastProposalPhase(c, 0, T ime, null)
4: FastProposalPhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Whitelist)
5: send FastPropose[c, Ballot, T ime, Whitelist] to all pj 2 ⇧
6: receive FastProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , OK/NACK]
from all pj 2 S ✓ ⇧ : |S| = FQ _ (timeout ^ |S| = CQ)
7: T ime MAXj{T imej : pi received
FastProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , OK/NACK] from pj}
8: Pred Sj Predj : pi received
FastProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , OK/NACK] from pj
9: if |S| = FQ ^ @j : pi received
FastProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , NACK] from pj then
10: StablePhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
11: else if 9j : pi received
FastProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , NACK] from pj then
12: RetryPhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
13: else
14: SlowProposalPhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
15: SlowProposalPhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
16: send SlowPropose[c, Ballot, T ime, Pred] to all pj 2 ⇧
17: receive SlowProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , OK/NACK]
from all pj 2 S ✓ ⇧ : |S| = CQ
18: T ime MAXj{T imej : pi received
SlowProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , OK/NACK] from pj}
19: Pred Sj Predj : pi received
SlowProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , OK/NACK] from pj
20: if @j : pi received
SlowProposeR[c, Ballot, T imej , Predj , NACK] from pj then
21: StablePhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
22: else
23: RetryPhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
24: RetryPhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
25: send Retry[c, Ballot, T ime, Pred] to all pj 2 ⇧
26: receive RetryR[c, Ballot, T ime, Predj ] from all pj 2 S ✓ ⇧ : |S| = CQ
27: Pred Sj Predj : pi received RetryR[c, Ballot, T ime, Predj ] from pj
28: StablePhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
29: StablePhase(c, Ballot, T ime, Pred)
30: send Stable[c, Ballot, T ime, Pred] to all pj 2 ⇧
2
P7:
P8:
Fig. 4. CAESAR’s pseudocode. The left part is executed by the command c’s leader pi, and the right part can be executed by any acceptor pj (including pi).
T ime < T ime then c¯ ∈ Pred, where Pred is the predecessor
set of c. Therefore, the decision order of non-commutative
commands is guaranteed to follow the increasing order of the
commands’ timestamps. However, this does not mean that if
c¯ ∈ Pred, then T ime < T ime. Hence the stable phase has to
take care of breaking any possible loop that might be created
by the predecessor sets of the stable commands, before trying
to deliver them (line S4 and lines 9–15 of Figure 3). That
is done as follows: for any two stable and non-commutative
commands c and c¯ with timestamps T and T¯ , respectively, if
T¯ > T then c¯ is deleted from c’s predecessor set.
When a command c is stable on all nodes, the information
about c can be safely garbage collected.
C. Slow Decision
In case the leader of a command c cannot guarantee a fast
decision for c, then it has to execute additional phases before
the finalization of the stable phase for c. This happens because
in the fast proposal phase for c (lines I1–I2, P1–P4, and
P11–P20), the command leader cannot collect a fast quorum
of FASTPROPOSER messages that are all marked with OK
(lines P7–P10) due to the following reasons: the fast quorum
of collected FASTPROPOSER messages actually includes a
message that rejects the proposed timestamp for c and is
marked with NACK (lines P7–P8, and R1–R8); or the leader
is only able to collect a classic quorum of CQ FASTPROPOSER
messages (lines P9–P10), because either there are no FQ
correct nodes in the system or the other N − CQ nodes are
too slow to provide their reply within a configurable timeout
to the command leader (line P2). In this subsection, we refer
to a slow decision by focusing on the former case; the latter
is explained in Section V-D.
Retry phase. This phase guarantees that the outcome of the
previous proposal phase for a command c is accepted by a
quorum of CQ nodes before moving to the stable phase for c.
At this stage, the leader pi of c broadcasts a RETRY message
with the maximum T ime among the ones suggested by the
acceptors in the previous phase, and the predecessor set Pred
as the union of the sets suggested by the acceptors in the
previous phase (line R1). Then pi waits for a quorum of CQ
RETRYR replies that confirm the timestamp T ime for c (line
R2), before submitting T ime to the next stable phase (line
R4). This guarantees that, even with f failures, there always
exists a correct node that confirmed T ime in this phase.
It is important to notice that as in the case of a FAST-
PROPOSER message, a RETRYR message from a node pj
also contains pj’s view of c’s predecessors set, which will be
included in the final Pred set in input to the next stable phase
(line R3). This is because, as shown in Section IV-B, c’s leader
has to include all the commands that were not predecessors
of c according to the timestamp proposed in the previous
proposal phase but that have to be considered as predecessors
according to the new timestamp of this phase.
Furthermore, a reply from an acceptor in this phase cannot
reject the broadcast timestamp for c, because, as it will be
clear in the proof of correctness (see Section V-F), at this stage
CAESAR guarantees that there does not exist any acceptor pj
and command c¯ such that c¯ is stable on pj with timestamp
T¯ > T and c is not in c¯’s predecessors set. Therefore,
when a node pj receives a RETRYR message with c, T ime,
and Pred, it only updates the tuple for c in its Hj by
marking it as accepted with T ime and Pred (line R5), and
it computes a new predecessors set Predj by calling the
COMPUTEPREDECESSORS function (line R7), like in the fast
proposal phase. Then, it sends a confirmation RETRYR back
to the command leader with the new Predj as well as the one
previously received by the leader (line R8).
D. Unavailability of Fast Quorums
In CAESAR, as in other fast consensus implementations [9],
there might exist scenarios where no fast quorum is available.
This happens due to our choice on the size of fast quorums,
i.e., FQ, which is greater than the minimum number of correct
nodes in the system, i.e., N − f . Therefore, under a period of
asynchrony of the system, where a message can experience an
arbitrarily long delay, a node is not able to distinguish whether
f nodes crashed or not, and hence a command leader that waits
for replies from a fast quorum of nodes could wait indefinitely
in a fast proposal phase.
This issue is solved in CAESAR by adopting a more com-
mon solution, namely the adoption of timeouts, but it requires
the interposition of an additional slow proposal phase after the
fast proposal phase and before either the retry or the stable
phase (see lines P21–P39). In particular, a command leader
can decide to execute a slow proposal phase without waiting
for a fast quorum of FQ replies if it has collected a quorum of
CQ FASTPROPOSER messages for a command c and none of
the messages have rejected the proposed timestamp (P9–P10).
The reason behind this design choice is the following:
intuitively, if a command leader did not collect a fast quorum
of OK replies, it cannot take a decision in two communication
delays by directly executing the stable phase, due to the
lower bound on fast consensus defined in [21]. Therefore,
after having collected a quorum of CQ replies in the fast
proposal phase, and if none of them has rejected the proposed
timestamp, the leader is required to execute an additional com-
munication phase, i.e., the slow proposal phase, by contacting
a quorum of CQ acceptors, in order to ensure that even after f
failures, there will always be a correct node having information
about the proposed timestamp.
Note that, the role played by the slow proposal phase is
similar to the one played by the retry phase, with the difference
that, unlike the case of the retry, an acceptor can still reject
a proposed timestamp for c in the slow proposal phase. For
the sake of clarity, we remind to Sections V-E and V-F for
more details. Also, for a more rigorous correctness proof see
Section V-F, and Section A in the appendix.
The execution of the slow proposal phase resembles the
execution of the fast proposal phase, with the following two
exceptions: obviously, the predecessors set Pred, which has
been computed in the fast proposal phase, has to be broadcast
as part of a SLOWPROPOSE message in the slow proposal
phase (lines P21 and P31); a node pj that receives a proposal
of a timestamp T and a set Pred for c in the slow proposal
phase, marks c as slow-pending in Hj if the WAIT function
does not reject T (lines P32, P37–P38).
E. Recovery from Failures
Whenever a node pi crashes, there might exist some com-
mand c whose leader is pi and whose decision would never
be finalized unless some explicit action is taken. Indeed, let
us suppose there exists a node pk that stores c with a status
different from stable. Then, according to the pseudocode of
Figure 4, pk would decide c only after having received a
STABLE message from pi.
For this reason, CAESAR also includes an explicit recovery
procedure (Figure 5) that finalizes the decision of commands
whose leader either crashed or has been suspected. Given the
aforementioned example, whenever the failure detector of pk
suspects pi, pk attempts to become c’s leader and finalizes the
decision of c. This is done by executing a Paxos-like prepare
phase, and collecting the most recent information about c from
a quorum of CQ nodes as follows: pk increments its current
ballot for c, i.e., Ballotsk[c], (line 2) and it broadcasts a
RECOVERY message for c with the new ballot (line 3). Then, it
1: RECOVERYPHASE(c)
2: Ballotsk[c]++
3: send RECOVERY[c, Ballotsk[c]] to all pj ∈ Π
4: receive RECOVERYR[c, Ballotsk[c],
〈c, Tj ,Predj ,−,Bj ,⊥/>〉/NOP]
from all pj ∈ S ⊆ Π : |S| = CQ
5: MaxBallot←MAX{Bj : pi received
RECOVERYR[c, Ballotsk[c], 〈c, Tj ,Predj ,−,Bj ,⊥/>〉] }
6: RecoverySet← {〈pj , Tj ,Predj ,−,⊥/>〉 : pi received
RECOVERYR[c, Ballotsk[c], 〈c, Tj ,Predj ,−,Bj ,⊥/>〉]
from pj ∧ Bj =MaxBallot }
7: if ∃ 〈pj , Tj ,Predj , stable,⊥〉 ∈ RecoverySet then
8: STABLEPHASE(c, Ballotsk[c], Tj , Predj )
9: else if ∃ 〈pj , Tj ,Predj , accepted,⊥〉 ∈ RecoverySet then
10: RETRYPHASE(c, Ballotsk[c], Tj , Predj )
11: else if ∃ 〈pj , Tj ,Predj , rejected,⊥〉 ∈ RecoverySet then
12: T ime← T Si
13: FASTPROPOSALPHASE(c, Ballotsk[c], T ime, null)
14: else if ∃ 〈pj , Tj ,Predj , slow-pending,⊥〉 ∈ RecoverySet then
15: SLOWPROPOSALPHASE(c, Ballotsk[c], Tj , Predj )
16: else if |RecoverySet| > 0 then
17: T ime← Tj :
∃〈pj , Tj ,Predj , fast-pending,⊥/>〉 ∈ RecoverySet
18: Pred← ⋃j Predj :
〈pj , Tj ,Predj , fast-pending,⊥/>〉 ∈ RecoverySet
19: if ∃ 〈pj , Tj ,Predj , fast-pending,>〉 ∈ RecoverySet then
20: WhiteList← Pred
21: else if |RecoverySet| ≥ ⌊ CQ2 ⌋+ 1 then
22: WhiteList← {c¯ ∈ Pred : @S ⊆ RecoverySet,
|S| ≥ ⌊ CQ2 ⌋+ 1 ∧∀〈pj , Tj ,Predj , fast-pending,⊥〉 ∈ S, c¯ 6∈ Predj }
23: else
24: WhiteList← null
25: else
26: T ime← T Si
27: FASTPROPOSALPHASE(c, Ballotsk[c], T ime, null)
28: upon receive RECOVERY[c, Ballot] from pk ∧ Ballot > Ballotsj [c]
29: Ballotsj [c]← Ballot
30: if Hj .CONTAINS(c) then
31: send RECOVERYR[c, Ballotsj [c], Hj .GETINFO(c)] to pk
32: else
33: send RECOVERYR[c, Ballotsj [c], NOP] to pk
Fig. 5. RECOVERY phase executed by node pk . Node pj is a receiver of
the RECOVERY message.
waits for a quorum of CQ RECOVERYR replies, which contain
information about c, before finalizing the decision for c (line
4). RECOVERYR from pj contains either the tuple of c in Hj
or NOP if such a tuple does not exist (lines 31–34).
A node pj that receives a RECOVERY message from pk
replies only if its ballot for c is lesser than the one it has
received. In such a case, pj also updates its ballot for c (lines
29–30). Like in Paxos, this is done to guarantee that no two
leaders can compete to finalize the decision for the same
command concurrently. In fact, if two leaders pk1 and pk2 both
successfully execute lines 3 and 4 of the recovery procedure
with ballots B1 and B2, respectively, then, if B1 < B2, for
any quorum of nodes S, there always exists a node in S
that never replies to pk1 (see the reception of FASTPROPOSE,
SLOWPROPOSE, RETRY, and STABLE messages in Figure 4).
When node pk successfully becomes c’s leader, it filters
the information for c that it has received by only keeping in
RecoverySet the data associated with the maximum ballot,
named MaxBallot in the pseudocode (lines 5–6). Each
tuple of the set is a sequence of node identifier, timestamp,
predecessors set, status, and forced boolean indicating: the
node that sent the information, the timestamp, the predecessors
set, the status of c on that node, and whether that information
has been forced by aWhiteList or not on that node. Then, pk
takes a decision for c according to the content ofRecoverySet
as follows. i) If there exists a tuple with status stable, then pk
starts a stable phase for c by using the necessary info from
that tuple, e.g., timestamp and predecessors set (lines 7–8). ii)
If there exists a tuple with status accepted, then pk starts a
retry phase for c by using the necessary info from that tuple
(lines 9–10). iii) If there exists a tuple with status rejected
or RecoverySet is empty, c was never decided, and hence pk
starts a fast proposal phase for c (lines 11–13, and 26–28) by
using a new timestamp (as described in Section V-B). iv) If
there exists a tuple with status slow-pending, then pk starts
a slow proposal phase for c by using the necessary info from
that tuple (lines 14–15). v) If the previous conditions are false,
then RecoverySet contains tuples with the same timestamp
T ime and status fast-pending (lines 16–25). In this last case,
pk starts a proposal phase for c with timestamp T ime because
c might have been decided with that timestamp in a previous
fast decision (line 25). If so, pk has to also choose the right
predecessors set that was adopted in that decision. Therefore,
it has to either choose a predecessors set in RecoverySet that
was forced by a previous recovery, if any (lines 19–20), or it
has to build its own WhiteList of commands that should be
forced as predecessors of c (lines 21–24).
This is done by noticing that: if c was decided in a fast de-
cision with ballot MaxBallot then the size of RecoverySet
cannot be lesser than
⌊CQ
2
⌋
+ 1, which is the minimum size
of the intersection of any classic quorum and any fast quorum
(lines 21 and 24); if a command c¯ was previously decided in
a fast decision and it has to be a predecessor of c, then there
cannot exist a subset of
⌊CQ
2
⌋
+ 1 tuples in RecoverySet,
whose predecessors sets do not contain c¯ (line 22). Note that,
the case in which c¯ was previously decided in a slow decision
and has to be a predecessor of c is handled by the computation
of predecessors set in the fast proposal phase (see line P13 of
Figure 4, and lines 1–3 of Figure 3).
F. Correctness
The complete formal proof on the correctness of CAESAR
is in Appendix A. We have also formalized a description
of CAESAR in TLA+ [22], and we have model-checked it
with the TLC model-checker. The TLA+ specification is in
Appendix B.
Here we provide the main intuition on how we proceeded
in proving that CAESAR implements the specification of
Generalized Consensus.
Let us also define the predicate DECIDED[c,T ,Pred,B] as
a predicate that is equal to true whenever a node decides
a command c with timestamp T , predecessors set Pred,
and ballot B. Then we can prove that CAESAR guarantees
Consistency by proving the following two theorems:
- ∀c, c¯, (DECIDED[c,T ,Pred,B] ∧ DECIDED[c¯,T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧
T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯ ⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred);
- ∀c (∃B, DECIDED[c,T ,Pred,B] ∧ ∀c¯ ∈ Pred, DE-
CIDED[c¯,T¯ ,Pred,B]⇒ ∀B′ ≥ B,(DECIDED[c,T ′,Pred′,B′]
⇒ T ′ = T ∧ Pred′ = Pred)).
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Fig. 6. Average latency for ordering and processing commands by changing the percentage of conflicting commands. Batching is disabled. Bars are overlapped:
e.g., in the case of 30% conflicts in Virginia, latency values are 90 msec, 108 msec, and 127 msec, for CAESAR, EPaxos, and M2Paxos, respectively.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implemented CAESAR in Java and contrasted it with
four state-of-the-art consensus protocols: M2Paxos, EPaxos,
Multi-Paxos, and Mencius. We used the Go language imple-
mentations of EPaxos, Multi-Paxos, and Mencius from the
authors of EPaxos. For M2Paxos, we used the open-source
implementation in Go. Note that Go compiles to native binary
while Java runs on top of the Java Virtual Machine. Thus,
we use a warmup phase before each experiment in order to
kickstart the Java JIT Compiler.
Competitors have been evaluated on Amazon EC2, using
m4.2xlarge instances (8 vCPU and 32GB RAM) running
Ubuntu Linux 16.04. Our benchmark issues client commands
to update a given key of a fully replicated Key-Value store.
Two commands are conflicting if they access the same key. The
command size is 15 bytes, which include key, value, request
ID, and operation type.
In our evaluations, we explored both conflicting and non-
conflicting workloads. When the clients issue conflicting com-
mands, the key is picked from a shared pool of 100 keys
with a certain probability depending on the experiment. As
a result, by categorizing a workload with 10% of conflicting
commands, we refer to the fact that 10% of the accessed keys
belong to the shared pool. To measure latency, we issued
requests in a closed loop by placing 10 clients co-located
with each node (50 in total), and for throughput the clients
injected requests to the system in an open loop. Performance
of competitors has been collected with and without network
batching (the caption indicates that).
We deployed the competitors on five nodes located in
Virginia (US), Ohio (US), Frankfurt (EU), Ireland (EU), and
Mumbai (India). This configuration spreads nodes such that
the latency to achieve a quorum is similar for all quorum-
based competitors. It is worth recalling that in a system with 5
nodes, CAESAR requires contacting one node more than other
quorum-based competitors to reach a fast decision. The round
trip time (RTT) that we measured in between nodes in EU and
US are all below 100ms. The node in India experiences the
following delays with respect to the other nodes: 186ms/VA,
301ms/OH, 112ms/DE, 122ms/IR. As in EPaxos, CAESAR
uses separate queues for handling different types of messages,
and each of these queues is handled by a separate pool of
threads. In CAESAR, conflicting commands are tracked using
a Red-Black tree data structure ordered by their timestamp.
Multi-Paxos is deployed in two settings: one where the leader
is located in Ireland, which is a node close to a quorum, and
one where the leader is in Mumbai, which needs to contact
nodes at long distance to have a quorum of responses.
A. Non-faulty Scenarios
In Figure 6, we report the average latency incurred by
CAESAR, EPaxos, and M2Paxos to order and execute a
command. Given the latency of a command is affected by
the position of the leader that proposes the command itself,
we show the results collected in each site. Each cluster of data
shows the behavior of a system while increasing the percentage
of conflicts in the range of {0% – no conflict, 2%, 10%, 30%,
50%, 100% – total order}.
At 0% conflicts, EPaxos and M2Paxos provide comparable
performance because both employ two communication steps
to order commands and the same size for quorums, with
EPaxos slightly faster because it does not need to acquire
the ownership on submitted commands before ordering. The
performance of CAESAR is slightly slower (on average 18%)
than EPaxos because of the need of contacting one more node
to reach consensus.
When the percentage of conflicting commands increases up
to 50%, CAESAR sustains its performance by providing an
almost constant latency; all other competitors degrade their
performance visibly. The reasons vary by protocol. EPaxos
degrades because its number of slow decisions increases ac-
cordingly, along with the complexity of analyzing the conflict
graph before delivering. For M2Paxos, the degradation is
related to the forwarding mechanism implemented when the
requested key is logically owned by another node. In that case,
M2Paxos passes the command to that node, which becomes
responsible to order it. This mechanism introduces an addi-
tional communication delay, which contributes to degraded
performance especially in geo-scale where the node having
the ownership of the key may be faraway. At last, we included
also the case of 100% conflicts. Here all competitors behave
poorly given the need for ordering all commands, which does
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Fig. 7. Average latency for ordering commands of Multi-Paxos (with a close
and faraway leader), Mencius, and CAESAR. Batching is disabled.
not represent their ideal deployment.
The latency provided by the node in India is higher than
other nodes. Here CAESAR is 50% slower than EPaxos only
when conflicts are low, because CAESAR has to contact one
more faraway node (e.g., Virginia) to deliver fast.
Performances of Multi-Paxos and Mencius are separately
reported in Figure 7 because these competitors are oblivious
to the percentage of conflicting commands injected in the
system. CAESAR 0% has also been included for reference.
Mencius’s performance is similar across the nodes because
it needs to collect feedbacks from all consensus participants,
and therefore it performs as the slowest node and on average
60% slower than CAESAR. The version of Multi-Paxos with
the leader in Mumbai (Multi-Paxos-IN) is not able to provide
low latency due to the delay that commands experience
while waiting for a response from the leader. On the other
hand, if the leader is placed in Ireland (Multi-Paxos-IR) the
quorum can be reached faster than the case of Multi-Paxos-
IN, thus command latency is significantly lower. Compared
with results in Figure 6, Multi-Paxos-IR and Multi-Paxos-IN
are, on average, 5% and 40% slower than CAESAR 100%,
respectively. 50
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Fig. 8. Latency per node while varying the number of connected clients (5
– 2000). Network messages are not batched.
Scalability of competitors is measured by loading the system
with more clients. Figure 8 shows the latency of CAESAR,
EPaxos, and M2Paxos for each site using a workload with
10% conflicting commands. The x-axis indicates the total
number of connected clients. The complex delivery phase of
EPaxos, where it has to analyze the dependency graph before
executing every command, slows down its performance as the
load increases while CAESAR provides a steady latency and
reaches its saturation only when more than 1500 total clients
are connected. M2Paxos stops scaling after 1000 connected
clients due to the impact of the forwarding mechanism.
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Fig. 9. Throughput by varying the percentage of conflicting commands. In
the top part of the plot batching is disabled, in the lower part it is enabled.
Figure 9 shows the total throughput obtained by each
competitor. Performance of Multi-Paxos and Mencius is placed
under the 0% case. The upper part of the plot has network
batching disabled. Here the performance of CAESAR degrades
by only 17% when moving from no conflict to 10% of
conflicting commands. EPaxos and M2Paxos have already
lost 24% and 45% of their performance with respect to
the no-conflict configuration. The cases of 30% and 50%
still show improvement for CAESAR, but now the impact
of the wait condition to deliver fast is more evident, which
explains the gap in throughput from the case of 10% conflicts.
M2Paxos is the system that behaves best when commands
are 100% conflicting. Here the impact of the forwarding
technique deployed when commands access an object owned
by a different node prevails over the ordering procedure of
EPaxos and CAESAR, which involves the exchange of a long
list of dependent commands over the network. Interestingly,
Multi-Paxos-IR performs as EPaxos 0%. That is because in
this setting and for both competitors, nodes in EU and US
can reach a quorum with a low latency, and both of them
suffer from the low performance of the Mumbai’s node. Also,
although they rely on different techniques to decide ordered
commands, in this setting the CPU cycles needed to handle
incoming messages are comparable.
In the bottom part of Figure 9, batching has been enabled.
Mencius’s implementation does not support batching thus
we omitted it. The trend is similar to the one observed
with batching disabled. The noticeable difference regards the
performance of EPaxos when the percentage of conflicts
increases. At 50% and 100% of conflicting commands, EPaxos
behaves better than other competitors because, although the
time needed for analyzing the conflict graph increases, it does
not deploy a wait condition that contributes to slow down
the ordering process if conflicts are excessive. In terms of
improvements, CAESAR sustains its high throughput up to
10% of conflicting commands by providing more than 320k
ordered commands per second, which is almost 3 times faster
than EPaxos. Multi-Paxos shows an expected behavior: it
performs well under its optimal deployment, where the leader
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Fig. 10. % of commands delivered using a slow decision by varying % of
conflicting commands. Batching here is disabled.
can reach consensus fast, but it degrades its performance
substantially if the leader moves to a faraway node.
CAESAR’s ability to take fewer slow decisions than existing
consensus protocols in presence of conflicts helps it to achieve
a lower latency and higher throughput than competitors. In
Figure 10, we show the percentage of commands that were
committed by taking fast decisions in both the protocols. It
should be noted that the number of slow decisions taken by
EPaxos is in the same range as the percentage of conflict.
However, that is not the case of CAESAR, where the number of
slow decisions more gracefully increases along with conflicts.
In fact, CAESAR takes more than 3 times fewer slow decisions
compared to EPaxos even under moderately conflicting (e.g.
30%) workloads. The reason for that is the wait condition that
provides the rejection of a command only when its timestamp
is invalid. In this experiment, to avoid confusion in analyzing
statistics, batching has been disabled.
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Fig. 11. Latency breakdown for CAESAR.
In Figure 11, we report the internal statistics of CAESAR
gathered during the experiment in Figure 9. Figure 11(a) shows
the breakdown of the proportion of latency consumed by each
ordering phase of the protocol. For no conflicts (0%, 2%), the
maximum time is spent in the proposal phase. The cost of the
delivery is very low, since there are no dependencies. However,
as conflicts increase, delivery becomes a major portion of
the total cost because a STABLE command must wait for
the delivery of all the conflicting commands with an earlier
timestamp before being delivered.
Figure 11(b) reports the average time spent on the wait
condition during the proposal phase by conflicting commands
using the same workload for throughput measurement. Note
that we used a different scale (right y-axis) for 30% of
conflicting commands to highlight the difference with respect
to the case of 2% and 10%. Close together nodes experience a
quicker timestamp advancement than faraway nodes because
they are able to exchange proposals faster. Also, given that
faraway nodes are not aware of this advancement, they pro-
pose commands with a lower timestamp, which causes their
conflicting commands to wait.
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Fig. 12. Throughput when one node fails.
In Figure 12, we report the throughput when one node
crashes, to show that it does not cause system’s unavailability.
We compared CAESAR and EPaxos. For this test, the requests
are injected in a closed-loop with 500 clients on each node.
After 20 seconds through the experiment, the instances of
CAESAR and EPaxos are suddenly terminated in one of the
nodes. Then, the clients from that node timeout and reconnect
to other nodes. This is visible by observing the throughput
falling down for few seconds due to loss of those 500 clients.
However, as the clients reconnect to other available nodes and
inject requests, the throughput restores back to the normal. In
our experiment, the recovery period lasted about 4 seconds.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that existing high-performance implemen-
tations of Generalized Consensus suffer from performance
degradation when the percentage of conflicting commands
increases. The reason is related to the way they establish a
fast decision. In this paper we present an innovative technique
that provides a very high probability of fast delivery.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof on the Correctness of Caesar
Nontriviality, Stability, and Liveness are guaranteed since: any node only decides commands that were proposed; the set of
decided commands monotonically grows on each node; and any command is eventually assigned to a correct leader, which
can eventually finalize the decision for it.
On the other hand we formally prove that CAESAR guarantees Consistency by showing that Theorems 1 and 2 hold in
Section A2. To do that we first introduce a preliminary terminology (Section A1), and we prove that Lemmas 1–11 hold
(Section A2).
1) Terminology: The predicates are defined as follows:
- DECIDED[c,T ,Pred,B] is equal to true whenever a node decides a command c with timestamp T , predecessors set Pred,
and ballot B.
- FASTDECISION[c,T ,Pred,B] is equal to true whenever a node decides a command c with timestamp T , predecessors set
Pred, and ballot B in a fast decision. This means that the command is decided in a stable phase after a transition from a
fast proposal phase (see transition FASTDECISION in the pseudocode of Figure 4).
- SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c,T ,Pred,B] is equal to true whenever a node decides a command c with timestamp T ,
predecessors set Pred, and ballot B in a slow decision after the execution of a retry phase. This means that the command is
decided in a stable phase after a transition from a retry phase (see transition SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY in the pseudocode
of Figure 4).
- SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c,T ,Pred,B] is equal to true whenever a node decides a command c with timestamp T ,
predecessors set Pred, and ballot B in a slow decision after the execution of a slow proposal phase. This means that
the command is decided in a stable phase after a transition from a slow proposal phase (see transition SLOWDECISION-
FROMPROPOSAL in the pseudocode of Figure 4).
- SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYFP[c,T ,Pred,B] is equal to true whenever a node decides a command c with timestamp T ,
predecessors set Pred, and ballot B in a slow decision after the execution of a retry phase, which is executed due to a
rejection in the fast proposal phase. This means that the command is decided in a stable phase after a transition from fast
proposal phase through a retry phase.
- SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYSP[c,T ,Pred,B] is equal to true whenever a node decides a command c with timestamp T ,
predecessors set Pred, and ballot B in a slow decision after the execution of a retry phase, which is executed due to a
rejection in the slow proposal phase. This means that the command is decided in a stable phase after a transition from slow
proposal phase through a retry phase.
- SLOWDECISION[c,T ,Pred,B] denotes any/all of the aforementioned predicates: SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY, SLOWDE-
CISIONFROMPROPOSAL, SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYFP, and SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYSP.
2) Proof on Consistency:
Lemma 1: ∀c, c¯, (FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧
(SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∨ SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B])
∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯)⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred.
Proof: ∀ c, T ,Pred,B : FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∀c¯ /∈ Pred : c¯ ∼ c,∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pj ∈ FQ,∃〈c, T ,Pred, fast-pending/stable,B,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ c¯ /∈ Predj ∧
(∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ T¯ < T )
⇓
(∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, fast-pending,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∨WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pj) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hj)
∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, accepted,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, slow-pending,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
c¯ is not decided slow at T¯ because
SLOWDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,−, B¯]⇒
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∃pj ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, slow-pending/accepted/stable, B¯2 ≥ B¯〉 ∈ Hj
And it won’t be decided at T¯ because as we saw above:
∀c, T ,Pred,B : FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∀c¯ /∈ Pred : c¯ ∼ c,∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pj ∈ CQ, (∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ T¯ < T )
⇓
(∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, fast-pending,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∨ (WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pj) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hj))
∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, slow-pending,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, accepted,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, stable,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
Lemma 2: ∀c, c¯, (FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred).
Proof:
FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ , P¯red, B¯] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred
∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pj ∈ FQ,∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predj , fast-pending/stable, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj∧
¬WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pj) ∧ @〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, rejected/accepted/slow-pending, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj
⇒ ∃FQ1,FQ2 ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pj ∈ FQ1 ∩ FQ2 : ∃〈c, T ,Predj , fast-pending/stable,B,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ c¯ /∈
Predj ∧ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predj , fast-pending/stable, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ ¬WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pj)
only if c¯ was not in some whitelist for c due to the intersections of FastQuorums
∃B′ ≤ B,∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pk ∈ CQ : ∃〈c, T ,Predk, fast-pending,B′,⊥〉 ∈ Hk ∧ ∃MAJ ⊆ CQ : |MAJ| =
b |CQ|2 c+ 1∧∀ph ∈ MAJ, (∃〈c, T ,Predh, fast-pending,B′,⊥〉 ∈ Hh ∧ c¯ /∈ Predh ∧ (@〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hh ∨ WAIT(c¯, T¯ , ph) ∨
∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hh)
∀FQ ∈ FastQuorums, ∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums, |FQ ∩ CQ| ≥ b |CQ|2 c+ 1
OR
∀FQ1,FQ2 ∈ FastQuorums, ∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,FQ1 ∩ FQ2 ∩ CQ 6= ∅
⇓
∀FQ ∈ FastQuorums, ∃ps ∈ FQ : @〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hh ∨WAIT(c¯, T¯ , ps) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hh
⇒ @Pred, B¯ : FASTDECISION(c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯)
Lemma 3: ∀c, c¯, (SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B]∧T¯ < T ∧c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈
Pred).
Proof:
Assume that,
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ , P¯red, B¯] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred ∧ c ∼ c¯
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∀pj : ∃〈c, T ,Pred, slow-pending/stable,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hj ∧ c¯ /∈ Predj
FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]⇒
∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pj ∈ FQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, fast-pending/stable, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj
∧¬WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pj) ∧ @〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, rejected, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ @〈c¯, T¯ ,Predj , accepted, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj
∧@〈c¯, T¯ ,Predj , slow-pending, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj
SLOWDECISION(c, T ,Pred,B)⇒ ∃B′ ≤ B : ∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∀pk ∈ CQ :
(
∃〈c, T ,Predk, fast-pending,B′,−〉 ∈ Hk ∧ c¯ /∈ Predk
∧ @〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hk ∨WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pk) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hk
∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predk, fast-pending, B¯,−〉
∧ ∃B′′ ≤ B′,∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀ph ∈ CQ′′ : ∃〈c, T ,Predh, fast-pending,B′′,⊥〉 ∈ Hh
∧ ∃MAJ ⊆ CQ′′ : |MAJ| = b |CQ′′|2 c+ 1 ∧ ∀ps ∈ MAJ
(
∃〈c, T ,Preds, fast-pending,B′′,⊥〉 ∈ Hs ∧ c¯ /∈ Preds
∧(@〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hs ∨WAIT(c¯, T¯ , ph) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hs)
)
)
⇓
Since ∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorum,∀FQ ∈ FastQuorums, CQ ∩ FQ 6= ∅
∧ ∀FQ1,FQ2 ∈ FastQuorums, ∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums ∨ FQ1 ∩ (FQ2 ∩ CQ) 6= ∅ ∧ |FQ2 ∩ CQ| ≥ b |CQ|2 c+ 1⇓
∀FQ ∈ FastQuorums, ∃pi ∈ FQ,@〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−, 〉 ∈ Hi ∨WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pi) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hi
⇓
¬FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]
This is a Contradiction.
Lemma 4: ∀c, c¯, (SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯ ⇒ c¯ ∈
Pred).
Proof:
Assume that
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred
Thus,
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∀pi ∈ CQ : ∃〈c, T ,Predi, accepted,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hi ∧
(@〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hi ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hi)
⇒ ¬FASTDECISION[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B]
This is a contradiction.
Lemma 5: ∀c, c¯, (SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred)
Proof:
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred ∧ c¯ ∼ c
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∃B′ ≤ B : ∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pj ∈ CQ,∃〈c, T ,Pred, fast-pending,B′,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ c¯ /∈ Predj
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]⇒
∃B′′ ≤ B¯ : ∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pk ∈ CQ,∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Pred, fast-pending,B′′,−〉 ∈ Hk ⇒
c¯ /∈ Pred⇒ ∃B′ ≤ B,∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pj ∈ CQ,∃〈c, T ,Predj , fast-pending,B′,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ c¯ /∈ Predj ∧
(
∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ⇒ (∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, fast-pending,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∨WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pj))
∧@〈c¯T¯ ,−, slow-pending,−,−〉 ∈ Hj
)
This is a contradiction if c¯ is decided in a slow propose phase.
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]⇒
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums ∃pk ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predk, slow-pending, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hk
∧¬WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pk) ∧ @〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hk
Lemma 6: ∀c, c¯, (SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYFP[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred).
Proof:
Assume that,
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYFP[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred ∧ c¯ ∼ c
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯ ⇒
∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pj ∈ CQ,∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predj , accepted, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ ∃B′′ ≤ B¯,
T2 < T¯ : ∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pk ∈ FQ : ∃〈c¯, T2,−, fast-pending/rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hk
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYFP[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∃B′ ≤ B : ∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∀pk ∈ CQ,∃〈c, T ,Predk, fast-prending,B′,−〉 ∈ Hk ∧ c¯ /∈ Predk∧
(
∃〈c¯, T3 < T ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hk ⇒ WAIT(c¯, T3, pk) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T3 < T ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hk∨
(
∃〈c¯, T3 < T ,−, fast-pending, B¯,−〉∧
∃B′′ ≤ B′,∃CQ′′ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pk ∈ CQ′′,∃〈c, T ,Predh, fast-pending,B′′,⊥〉 ∈ Hh
∧ ∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀ps ∈ FQ ∩ CQ′′,∃〈c, T ,Preds, fast-pending,B′′,⊥〉 ∈ Hs
∧ c¯ /∈ Preds ∧ (∃〈c¯, T3 < T ,−,−,−,−, 〉 ∈ Hs ⇒ WAIT(c¯, T3, ps) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T3 < T ,−, rejected〉)
)
)
Since FQ ∩ CQ 6= ∅ and FQ1 ∩ FQ2 ∩ CQ 6= ∅
∀FQ ∈ FastQuorums, ∃pi ∈ FQ : ∃〈c¯, T3 < T ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hi ⇒ WAIT(c¯, T , pi) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T3,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈
Hi ⇒
@CQ ∈ ClassicQuorum : ∀pi ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ < T ,−, accepted,−,−〉 ∈ Hi ⇒
¬SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYFP[c¯, T¯ , ¯Pred, B¯] in retry phase started in fast propose phase.
This is a contradiction.
Lemma 7: ∀c, c¯, (SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYSP[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred).
Proof:
Assume that,
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRYSP[c¯, T¯ , ¯Pred, B¯] ∧ T¯ ∧ T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred ∧ c¯ ∼ c
c¯ /∈ Pred⇒
∃B′ ≤ B,∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pj ∈ CQ,∃〈c, T ,Pred, fast-pending,B′,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ c¯ /∈ Predj ∧ (∃〈c¯, T2 <
T ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ⇒
(∃〈c¯, T2 < T ,−, fast-pending,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∨WAIT(c¯, T2 < T , pj) ∨ ∃〈c¯, T2 < T ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hj)
∧(@〈c¯, T2 < T ,−, accepted,−,−〉 ∈ Hj ∧ @〈c¯, T2 < T ,−, slow-pending,−,−〉 ∈ Hj)
This is a contradiction because
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL(c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯)⇒
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∃pk ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predk, accepted, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hk ∧ ¬WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pk) ∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hk
Lemma 8: ∀c, c¯, (SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
(SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∨
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B]) ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred).
Proof:
Assume that,
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY(c, T ,Pred,B) ∧ SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c¯ /∈ Pred ∧ c¯ ∼ c
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY(c, T ,Pred,B)⇒
∃CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∀pi ∈ CQ : ∃〈c, T ,Predi, accepted,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hi ∧ c¯ /∈ Predi
∧(@〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−, 〉 ∈ Hi ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−, 〉 ∈ Hi)⇒
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∃pi ∈ CQ : @〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hi ∨ ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, rejected,−,−〉 ∈ Hi
⇒ ¬SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]
This a contradiction.
Theorem 1: ∀c, c¯, (DECIDED[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ∧ T¯ < T ∧ c ∼ c¯⇒ c¯ ∈ Pred).
Proof:
The proof follows from the Lemmas 1–8
Lemma 9: ∀c (∃B, SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
∀c¯ ∈ Pred,DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B]⇒
∀B′ ≥ B, (DECIDED[c, T ′,Pred′,B′]⇒ T ′ = T ∧ Pred′ = Pred)).
Proof:
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ ∃c¯ ∈ Pred : DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,−,−] ∧ T¯ < T ⇒ ∀B′ ≥
B,DECIDED[c, T ,Pred′,B′] ∧ c¯ ∈ Pred′
SLOWDECISIONFROMPROPOSAL[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∃pi ∈ CQ : ∃〈c, T ,Pred, slow-pending/stable,B,−〉 ∈ Hi ∨
〈c, T ,Pred, slow-pending/stable,B′,−〉 ∈ Hi
Lemma 10: ∀c (∃B, SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c, T ,Pred,B]∧
∀c¯ ∈ Pred,DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B]⇒
∀B′ ≥ B, (DECIDED[c, T ′,Pred′,B′]⇒ T ′ = T ∧ Pred′ = Pred)).
Proof:
SLOWDECISIONFROMRETRY[c, T ,Pred,B]⇒
∀B′ ≥ B,∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums, (∃pi ∈ CQ : ∃〈c, T ,−, accepted,B′,−〉 ∈ Hi) ∧ (∃pk ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−,−,−,−〉 ∈
pk)
Lemma 11: ∀c (∃B, FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ ∀c¯ ∈ Pred,DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B]⇒
∀B′ ≥ B, (DECIDED[c, T ′,Pred′,B′]⇒ T ′ = T ∧ Pred′ = Pred)).
Proof:
FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B]∧∃c¯ ∈ Pred : DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]∧T¯ < T ⇒ ∀B′ ≥ B,DECIDED[c, T ,Pred′,B′]∧c¯ ∈
Pred′
DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]∧
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,@ph ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, accepted/slow-pending/stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hh
⇒ ∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pi ∈ FQ,∃〈c¯, T¯ ,Predi, fast-pending, B¯′,−〉 ∈ Hi∧
@〈c¯, T¯ ,Predi, rejected, B¯,−〉 ∈ Hi ∧ ¬WAIT(c¯, T¯ , pi)
⇒ ∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pi ∈ FQ,∃〈c, T ,Pred, stable,B′,−〉 ∈ Hk∨
(∃〈c, T ,Predi, fast-pending,B′,−〉 ∈ Hi ∧ c¯ ∈ Predi) ∨ @〈c, T ,Predi,−,−,−〉 ∈ Hi
FASTDECISION[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred, B¯]∧
∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,@pk ∈ CQ : ∃〈c¯, T¯ ,−, accepted/slow-pending/stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hh
⇒ ∃FQ1,FQ2 ∈ FastQuorums : ∀pi ∈ FQ1 ∩ FQ2, (∃〈c, T ,Predi, fast-pending,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hi ∧ c¯ ∈ Predi) ∨
(∃〈c, T ,Predi, stable,B′,−〉 ∈ Hi)
Since ∀FQ1,FQ2 ∈ FastQuorums, ∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,FQ1 ∩ FQ2 ∩ CQ 6= ∅
⇒ ∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums,∃FQ ∈ FastQuorums :
∃pi ∈ CQ ∩ FQ : (∃〈c, T ,Predi, fast-pending,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hi ∧ c¯ ∈ Predi)
∨(∃〈c, T ,Predi, stable,B′,−〉 ∈ Hi)∀B′ ≥ B,∃pk : ∃〈c, T ,Predk, fast-pending,B′,>〉 ∈ Hk ⇒ c¯ ∈ Predk
Therefore
∀B′ ≥ B,∀CQ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∃pi : ∃〈c, T ,−, fast-pending/slow-pending/stable,B′,−〉 ∧
@〈c, T ,−, rejected,B′,−〉 ∈ Hi ∧
(
∃pj ∈ CQ : ∃c¯, T¯ ,−, accepted/slow-pending/stable,−,−〉 ∈ Hk ∨
∃pk ∈ CQ : ∃c, T ,Predk, fast-pending,B′,>〉 ∈ Hk ∧ c¯ ∈ Predk ∨
@FQ ∈ FastQuorums, @CQ′ ∈ ClassicQuorums : ∀pk ∈ FQ ∩ CQ′,
∃〈c, T ,Predk, fast-pending,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hk ∧
c¯ ∈ Predk ∧ @〈c, T ,Pred, stable,B,⊥〉 ∈ Hk
)
Theorem 2: ∀c(∃B,DECIDED[c, T ,Pred,B] ∧ ∀c¯ ∈ Pred,DECIDED[c¯, T¯ ,Pred,B] ⇒ ∀B′ ≥
B, (DECIDED[c, T ′,Pred′,B′]⇒ T ′ = T ∧ Pred′ = Pred)).
Proof: The proof follows from the Lemmas 9–11
B. TLA+ Specification of Caesar
1 module Caesar4
4 extends TLC , Sequences, Integers, Maps, Quorums, Commands
6 constant NumBallots
8 instance Ballots with SubBallots ← {1, 2, 3}
MaxTime bounds the timestamp that can be assigned to commands, but not to retries.
14 constants MaxTime
16 Time
∆
= 1 . . MaxTime
**********
20 --algorithm Caesar{
22 variables
23 maps an acceptor p and a command c to a ballot b,
24 indicating that the acceptor p is in ballot b for command c:
25 ballot = [p ∈ P 7→ [c ∈ C 7→ 〈0, 1〉]],
26 maps an acceptor p and a command c to a map from ballot to vote:
27 vote = [p ∈ P 7→ [c ∈ C 7→ 〈〉]],
28 Maps ballots to proposals
29 propose = 〈〉,
30 maps a pair 〈c, b〉 to a set of dependencies ds and a timestamp t ,
31 indicating that c has been committed in ballot b
32 with timestamp t and dependencies ds:
33 stable = 〈〉,
34 a set of pairs 〈c, b〉, indicating that the ballot-b leader of c asks
35 all acceptors to join ballot b:
36 join = {}
38 define {
40 Status
∆
= {“pending”, “stable”, “accepted”, “rejected”}
42 Vote
∆
= [ts : Nat , status : Status, deps : subset C ]
44 Propose
∆
= [ts : Time] ∪ [ts : Nat , phase1Deps : subset C ] ∪ [ts : Nat , deps : subset C ]
46 TypeInvariant
∆
=
47 ∧ ∀ p ∈ P , c ∈ C : ballot [p][c] ∈ Ballot
48 ∧ ∀ p ∈ P , c ∈ C : ∃D ∈ subset Ballot : vote[p][c] ∈ [D → Vote]
49 ∧ ∃D ∈ subset (C × Ballot) : propose ∈ [D → Propose]
50 ∧ ∃D ∈ subset (C × Ballot) : stable ∈ [D → [ts : Nat , deps : subset C ]]
51 ∧ join ∈ subset (C × Ballot)
53 We use the letter B for major ballots. A ballot if of the form 〈B , phase〉
1
54 Phase1(B)
∆
= 〈B , 1〉
55 Phase2(B)
∆
= 〈B , 2〉
56 Phase3(B)
∆
= 〈B , 3〉
58 All the commands ever seen by p in any ballot.
59 SeenCmds(p)
∆
= {c ∈ C : domain vote[p][c] 6= {}}
61 true if c was seen in ballot b at p.
62 SeenAt(c, b, p)
∆
= b ∈ domain vote[p][c]
64 The highest c-ballot in which p participated.
65 LastBal(c, max , p)
∆
= let bals
∆
= {b ∈ domain vote[p][c] : b  max}in
66 if bals 6= {}
67 then Max (bals)
68 else Bot
70 The vote for c on p in the highest c-ballot in which p participated.
71 MaxVote(c, p)
∆
= vote[p][c][LastBal(c, Max (Ballot), p)]
73 Given a quorum q, the maximum ballot strictly less than b in which an acceptor in q has participated.
74 MaxBal(c, B , q)
∆
=
75 let bals
∆
= {LastBal(c, Pred(Phase1(B)), p) : p ∈ q}
76 in Max (bals)
78 The timestamp found at p in the vote for c in the highest ballot.
79 TimeStampOf (c, p)
∆
= MaxVote(c, p).ts
81 All the timestamps on acceptor p
82 TimeStamps(p)
∆
= {〈c, TimeStampOf (c, p)〉 : c ∈ SeenCmds(p)}
84 All the commands at p which have a lower timestamp than 〈c, t〉
85 CmdsWithLowerT (p, c, t)
∆
= {c2 ∈ SeenCmds(p) : 〈c2, TimeStampOf (c2, p)〉 < 〈c, t〉}
87 The dependencies to include in the phase-1 reply of an acceptor.
88 Phase1ReplyDeps(p, c, b, t)
∆
=
89 if “phase1Deps” ∈ domain propose[〈c, b〉]
90 then
91 let new
∆
= {c2 ∈ SeenCmds(p) :
92 ∧ 〈c2, TimeStampOf (c2, p)〉 < 〈c, t〉
93 ∧ let last ∆= LastBal(c2, Max (Ballot), p)
94 status
∆
= vote[p][c2][last ].statusin
95 ∨ last = 〈0, 1〉 ∧ status = “stable”
96 ∨ 〈0, 1〉 ≺ last ∧ status ∈ {“accepted”, “pending”, “stable”}}
97 in propose[〈c, b〉].phase1Deps ∪ new
98 else CmdsWithLowerT (p, c, t)
100 the set of acceptors in q that participated in ballot b of command c.
101 ParticipatedIn(b, c, q)
∆
= {p ∈ q : b ∈ domain vote[p][c]}
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103 The local dependencies of c at p.
104 Deps(c, p)
∆
= MaxVote(c, p).deps \ {c}
106 c1 at timestamp t1 conflicts with c2 on p.
107 Conflicts(p, c1, t1, c2)
∆
=
108 ∧ 〈c1, t1〉 < 〈c2, TimeStampOf (c2, p)〉
109 ∧ c1 /∈ Deps(c2, p)
111 Blocks(p, c1, t1, c2)
∆
=
112 ∧ Conflicts(p, c1, t1, c2)
113 ∧MaxVote(c2, p).status /∈ {“stable”, “accepted”}
115 command c with timestamp t is blocked on p.
116 Blocked(p, c, t)
∆
= ∃ c2 ∈ SeenCmds(p) : Blocks(p, c, t , c2)
118 Command c with timestamp t does not encounter any conflict on acceptor p.
119 NoConflict(p, c, t)
∆
= ∀ c2 ∈ SeenCmds(p) : ¬Conflicts(p, c, t , c2)
121 The timestamp computed locally by an acceptor when it reject a command.
122 RejectTimestamp(c, p)
∆
= GT (c, TimeStamps(p))
124 The timestamp computed by a leader when it retries a command after a reject.
125 RetryTimestamp(c, b, q)
∆
= GTE (c, {〈c, vote[p][c][b].ts〉 : p ∈ q})
127 Command c is pending in ballot b on all acceptors in quorum q.
128 PendingOnQuorum(c, b, q)
∆
= ∀ p ∈ q :
129 ∧ SeenAt(c, b, p)
130 ∧ vote[p][c][b].status = “pending”
132 Command c has been reject by one acceptor among quorum q.
133 RejectedOnQuorum(c, b, q)
∆
=
134 ∧ ∀ p ∈ q : SeenAt(c, b, p)
135 ∧ ∃ p ∈ q : vote[p][c][b].status = “rejected”
137 Command c has been accepted in ballot b by all acceptors in quorum q.
138 AcceptedOnQuorum(c, b, q)
∆
= ∀ p ∈ q :
139 ∧ SeenAt(c, b, p)
140 ∧ vote[p][c][b].status = “accepted”
142 Rejected(c, ps, b)
∆
= ∃ p ∈ ps : vote[p][c][b].status = “rejected”
144 VotedDeps(q , c, b)
∆
= union {vote[p][c][b].deps : p ∈ q}
146 Pending(c, ps, b)
∆
= ∀ p ∈ ps :
147 vote[p][c][b].status /∈ {“stable”, “rejected”}
149 AVote(ps, c, b)
∆
= (let p
∆
= choose p ∈ ps : truein vote[p][c][b])
151 PossibleFastQuorums(q , ps)
∆
= {fq ∈ FastQuorum : fq ∩ q ⊆ ps}
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153 ConfirmedIfFast(c, ps, fqs, b)
∆
=
154 let deps
∆
= VotedDeps(ps, c, b)
155 in {c2 ∈ deps : (∀ q ∈ fqs :
156 ∃ p ∈ q ∩ ps : c2 ∈ vote[p][c][b].deps)}
The two correctness properties, whose conjunction implies correct SMR:
162 GraphInvariant
∆
= ∀ c1, c2 ∈ C : ∀ b1, b2 ∈ Ballot :
163 ∧ 〈c1, b1〉 ∈ domain stable
164 ∧ 〈c2, b2〉 ∈ domain stable
165 ∧ c1 6= c2
166 ∧ 〈c1, stable[〈c1, b1〉].ts〉 < 〈c2, stable[〈c2, b2〉].ts〉
167 ⇒ c1 ∈ stable[〈c2, b2〉].deps
169 Agreement
∆
= ∀ c ∈ C : ∀ b1, b2 ∈ Ballot :
170 ∧ 〈c, b1〉 ∈ domain stable
171 ∧ 〈c, b2〉 ∈ domain stable
172 ⇒ stable[〈c, b1〉].ts = stable[〈c, b2〉].ts
173 }
Finally, the algorithm:
Macros for the acceptor actions.
183 macro BallotPre(c, b){
184 when if Phase(b) = 1 then ballot [p][c] = b else ballot [p][c] ≺ b ;
185 when 〈c, b〉 ∈ domain propose ;
186 ballot := [ballot except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = b]] ;
187 }
189 macro Phase1Reply(p){
190 with (c ∈ C ; B ∈ MajorBallot , b = Phase1(B)){
191 BallotPre(c, b) ;
192 with (t = propose[〈c, b〉].ts){
193 when ¬Blocked(self , c, t) ; No higher-timestamped command is blocking c.
194 if (NoConflict(p, c, t)){
195 vote := [vote except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = @ ++
196 〈b, [ts 7→ t , status 7→ “pending”, deps 7→ Phase1ReplyDeps(p, c, b, t)]〉]] ;
197 }
198 else {
199 Collect all commands received so far; compute a strict upper bound on their timestamp:
200 with ( t2 = RejectTimestamp(c, p)){
201 Record the fact that the command was rejected with t2:
202 vote := [vote except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = @
203 ++ 〈b, [ts 7→ t2[2], status 7→ “rejected”, deps 7→
204 CmdsWithLowerT (p, c, t2[2])]〉]] ;
205 }
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206 }
207 }
208 }
209 }
211 macro Phase2Reply(p){
212 with (c ∈ C ; B ∈ MajorBallot , b = Phase2(B)){
213 BallotPre(c, b) ;
214 with (t = propose[〈c, b〉].ts){
215 when ¬Blocked(self , c, t) ; No higher-timestamped command is blocking c.
216 if (NoConflict(p, c, t)){
217 vote := [vote except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = @ ++
218 〈b, [ts 7→ t , status 7→ “pending”, deps 7→ propose[〈c, b〉].deps]〉]] ;
219 }
220 else {
221 with (t2 = RejectTimestamp(c, p)){
222 vote := [vote except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = @
223 ++ 〈b, [ts 7→ t2[2], status 7→ “rejected”, deps 7→
224 CmdsWithLowerT (p, c, t2[2])]〉]] ;
225 }
226 }
227 }
228 }
229 }
231 macro Phase3Reply(p){
232 with (c ∈ C ; B ∈ MajorBallot , b = Phase3(B)){
233 BallotPre(c, b) ;
234 with (t = propose[〈c, b〉].ts){
235 vote := [vote except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = @ ++ 〈b, [
236 ts 7→ t , status 7→ “accepted”,
237 deps 7→ CmdsWithLowerT (p, c, t) ∪ propose[〈c, b〉].deps]〉]] ;
238 }
239 }
240 }
242 macro LearnStable(p){
243 with (c ∈ C ; b ∈ Ballot){
244 when ballot [p][c]  b ∧ 〈c, b〉 ∈ domain stable ;
245 ballot := [ballot except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = b]] ;
246 with (s = stable[〈c, b〉]){
247 vote := [vote except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = @ ++ 〈b, [
248 status 7→ “stable”,
249 ts 7→ s.ts,
250 deps 7→ s.deps]〉]] ;
251 }
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252 }
253 }
255 macro JoinBallot(p){ Note that every process is in the first ballot (0) by default.
256 with (prop ∈ join ; c = prop[1], b = prop[2]){
257 when ballot [p][c] ≺ b ;
258 ballot := [ballot except ! [p] = [@ except ! [c] = b]] ;
259 }
260 }
Macros for the leader actions.
266 macro StartPhase1(c, B , t){
267 assert 〈c, Phase1(B)〉 /∈ domain propose ;
268 propose := propose ++ 〈〈c, Phase1(B)〉, [ts 7→ t ]〉 ;
269 goto end1 ;
270 }
272 macro StartPhase2(c, B , t , deps){
273 assert 〈c, Phase2(B)〉 /∈ domain propose ;
274 propose := propose ++ 〈〈c, Phase2(B)〉, [ts 7→ t , deps 7→ deps]〉 ;
275 goto end2 ;
276 }
278 macro StartPhase3(c, B , t , deps){
279 assert 〈c, Phase3(B)〉 /∈ domain propose ;
280 propose := propose ++ 〈〈c, Phase3(B)〉, [ts 7→ t , deps 7→ deps]〉 ;
281 goto end3 ;
282 }
284 macro StartBallot(c, B){
285 assert 〈c, Phase1(B)〉 /∈ join ;
286 join := join ∪ {〈c, Phase1(B)〉} ;
287 }
289 macro MakeStable(c, b, t , deps){
290 stable := stable ++ 〈〈c, b〉, [ts 7→ t , deps 7→ deps]〉 ;
291 goto decided ;
292 }
Specification of the acceptors:
297 process (acc ∈ P){
298 acc : while (true){
299 either {
300 Phase1Reply(self ) ;
301 }or {
302 LearnStable(self ) ;
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303 }or {
304 Phase2Reply(self ) ;
305 }or {
306 Phase3Reply(self ) ;
307 }or {
308 JoinBallot(self ) ;
309 }
310 }
311 }
Specification of the leaders:
316 process (leader ∈ (C ×MajorBallot)){
317 start : either { Initial proposal for the command.
318 when self [2] = 0 ;
319 phase1: with (t ∈ Time){
320 StartPhase1(self [1], self [2], t)
321 }
322 }or { Start a new ballot.
323 when self [2] > 0 ; Only start ballots greater than 0; 0 is started by default.
324 startBal : StartBallot(self [1], self [2]) ;
325 recover : with (q ∈ Quorum, c = self [1], B = self [2]){ recover major ballot B .
326 when ∀ p ∈ q : Phase1(B)  ballot [p][c] ; every p in the quorum is in b or higher.
327 no p ∈ q can be in Phase2(B) or Phase3(B), because only the leader of B can make them do that,
328 and it did not do it yet:
329 assert ∀ p ∈ q : ballot [p][c] /∈ {Phase2(B), Phase3(B)} ;
330 with (maxBal = MaxBal(c, B , q) ; ps = ParticipatedIn(maxBal , c, q)){
331 assert maxBal [1] < B ; Sanity check.
332 if (maxBal = Bot) with (t ∈ Time){
333 No acceptor in q has seen the command.
334 StartPhase1(c, B , t)
335 }
336 else if (∃ p ∈ ps : vote[p][c][maxBal ].status = “stable”){
337 when false ; This case is not interesting
338 }
339 else if (Phase(maxBal) = 3)
340 with (v = AVote(ps, c, maxBal), t = v .ts, ds = v .deps){
341 StartPhase3(c, B , t , ds) ;
342 }
343 else if (Phase(maxBal) ∈ {1, 2} ∧ Rejected(c, ps, maxBal))
344 with (t ∈ Time){ use an arbitrary timestamp.
345 An invariant at this point:
346 assert ∀ p ∈ P : c ∈ domain vote[p]⇒
347 ∀ b2 ∈ domain vote[p][c] : b2  maxBal ⇒
348 vote[p][c][b2].status /∈ {“accepted”, “stable”} ;
349 StartPhase1(c, B , t) ;
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350 }
351 else if (Phase(maxBal) = 2 ∧ Pending(c, ps, maxBal))
352 with (v = AVote(ps, c, maxBal), t = v .ts, ds = v .deps){
353 assert ∀ p ∈ ps : vote[p][c][maxBal ].status = “pending” ;
354 StartPhase2(c, B , t , ds) ;
355 }
356 else if (Phase(maxBal) = 1 ∧ Pending(c, ps, maxBal))
357 with (t = AVote(ps, c, maxBal).ts){
358 assert ∀ p ∈ ps : vote[p][c][maxBal ].status = “pending” ;
359 if (∃ p ∈ ps : “phase1Deps” ∈ domain vote[p][c][maxBal ])
360 Start phase1 with the same “phase1Deps” value:
361 with (p = choose p ∈ ps : “phase1Deps” ∈ domain vote[p][c][maxBal ]){
362 propose := propose ++ 〈〈c, Phase1(B)〉,
363 [ts 7→ t , phase1Deps 7→ vote[p][c][maxBal ].phase1Deps]〉 ;
364 }
365 else with (fqs = PossibleFastQuorums(q , ps)){
366 if (fqs 6= {}){
367 Start phase1 with a “phase1Deps” set:
368 propose := propose ++ 〈〈c, Phase1(B)〉,
369 [ts 7→ t , phase1Deps 7→ ConfirmedIfFast(c, ps, fqs, maxBal)]〉 ;
370 }
371 else {StartPhase1(c, B , t)}
372 }
373 }
374 else {
375 assert false ; We must have covered all cases.
376 }
377 }
378 }
379 } ;
380 end1:
381 either {
382 Fast decision
383 with (q ∈ FastQuorum, c = self [1], b = Phase1(self [2])){
384 when PendingOnQuorum(c, b, q) ;
385 with ( ds = VotedDeps(q , c, b) ; t = propose[〈c, b〉].ts){
386 MakeStable(c, b, t , ds) ;
387 }
388 } ;
389 }or {
390 there is a reject, trigger phase 3.
391 with (q ∈ Quorum, c = self [1], b = Phase1(self [2])){
392 when RejectedOnQuorum(c, b, q) ;
393 with ( ds = VotedDeps(q , c, b) ; t = RetryTimestamp(c, b, q)){
394 StartPhase3(c, b[1], t [2], ds) ;
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395 }
396 }
397 }or {
398 Timeout, trigger phase 2
399 with (q ∈ Quorum, c = self [1], b = Phase1(self [2])){
400 when PendingOnQuorum(c, b, q) ;
401 with ( ds = VotedDeps(q , c, b) ; t = AVote(q , c, b).ts){
402 assert ∀ p ∈ q : vote[p][c][b].ts = t ;
403 StartPhase2(c, b[1], t , ds) ;
404 }
405 }
406 } ;
407 end2: either {
408 Decision in phase 2
409 with (q ∈ Quorum, c = self [1], b = Phase2(self [2])){
410 when PendingOnQuorum(c, b, q) ;
411 with (v = AVote(q , c, b), ds = v .deps, t = v .ts){
412 assert ∀ p ∈ q : vote[p][c][b].ts = t ;
413 MakeStable(c, b, t , ds) ;
414 }
415 }
416 }or {
417 Reject in phase 2, trigger phase 3
418 with (q ∈ Quorum, c = self [1], b = Phase2(self [2])){
419 when RejectedOnQuorum(c, b, q) ;
420 with ( ds = VotedDeps(q , c, b) ; t = RetryTimestamp(c, b, q)){
421 StartPhase3(c, b[1], t [2], ds) ;
422 }
423 }
424 } ;
425 end3: Decide in phase 3
426 with (q ∈ Quorum, c = self [1], b = Phase3(self [2])){
427 when AcceptedOnQuorum(c, b, q) ;
428 with ( ds = VotedDeps(q , c, b) ; t = propose[〈c, b〉].ts){
429 assert ∀ p ∈ q : vote[p][c][b].ts = t ;
430 MakeStable(c, b, t , ds) ;
431 }
432 } ;
433 decided : skip
434 }
435 }
438
\ * Modification History
\ * Last modified Sat May 21 21:10:29 EDT 2016 by nano
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1 module Maps
Adding a key-value mapping (kv [1] is the key, kv [2] the value) to a map
6 f ++ kv
∆
= [x ∈ domain f ∪ {kv [1]} 7→ if x = kv [1] then kv [2] else f [x ]]
The image of a map
11 Image(f )
∆
= {f [x ] : x ∈ domain f }
15
\ ∗ Modification History
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1 module Ballots
3 extends FiniteSets, Naturals, Integers
5 constant NumBallots, SubBallots
Ballots are of the form 〈b, i〉, where b is the main ballot number and i the sub-ballot number.
Ballots are totally ordered:
11 MajorBallot
∆
= 0 . . (NumBallots − 1)
12 Ballot
∆
= MajorBallot × SubBallots
14 assume NumBallots ∈ Nat ∧NumBallots ≥ 1
16 bal1 ≺ bal2 ∆=
17 if bal1[1] = bal2[1]
18 then bal1[2] < bal2[2]
19 else bal1[1] < bal2[1]
21 bal1  bal2 ∆=
22 bal1 ≺ bal2 ∨ bal1 = bal2
The maximum element in a set of ballots.
27 Max (xs)
∆
= choose x ∈ xs : ∀ y ∈ xs : y  x
Bot is not a ballot, but Bot ≺ b holds for any ballot b.
32 Bot
∆
= 〈 − 1, 3〉
The predecessor of a ballot. Note that Pred(〈0, 1〉) = Bot .
37 Pred(b)
∆
= case
38 b[2] = 1→ 〈b[1]− 1, 3〉
39 2 b[2] = 2→ 〈b[1], 1〉
40 2 b[2] = 3→ 〈b[1], 2〉
42 Maj (b)
∆
= b[1]
43 Phase(b)
∆
= b[2]
45
\ ∗ Modification History
\ ∗ Last modified Tue May 03 08:54:58 EDT 2016 by nano
\ ∗ Created Mon May 02 21:17:10 EDT 2016 by nano
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1 module Quorums
3 extends FiniteSets, Naturals, Integers
5 constant Quorum, FastQuorum, P
7 assume ∀Q ∈ Quorum : Q ⊆ P
8 assume ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Quorum : Q1 ∩Q2 6= {}
9 assume ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ FastQuorum : ∀Q3 ∈ Quorum : Q1 ∩Q2 ∩Q3 6= {}
Majority quorums and three fourths quorums. For provinding concrete quorums to the model-
checker.
15 MajQuorums
∆
= {Q ∈ subset P : 2 ∗ Cardinality(Q) > Cardinality(P)}
16 ThreeFourthQuorums
∆
= {Q ∈ subset P : 4 ∗ Cardinality(Q) > 3 ∗ Cardinality(P)}
18
\ ∗ Modification History
\ ∗ Last modified Mon May 02 22:20:24 EDT 2016 by nano
\ ∗ Created Mon May 02 21:03:00 EDT 2016 by nano
1
1 module Commands
3 extends Naturals
5 constants C , CmdId( )
7 assume ∀ c ∈ C : CmdId(c) ∈ Nat ∧ ∀ c2 ∈ C : c 6= c2
8 ⇒ CmdId(c) 6= CmdId(c2)
An ordering relation among pairs of the form 〈c, timestamp〉. Allows to break ties between
timestamps by also using the command to compute the ordering.
CAUTION: C must not be a symmetrical set in TLC ’s configuration, because commands are
ordered.
18 ts1 < ts2
∆
=
19 if ts1[2] = ts2[2] if same timestamp:
20 then CmdId(ts1[1]) < CmdId(ts2[1]) break ties with command id.
21 else ts1[2] < ts2[2] else compare timestamps.
A timestamp for c strictly greater than the max of the timstamps xs.
26 GT (c, xs)
∆
=
27 let max
∆
= choose x ∈ xs : ∀ y ∈ xs : x 6= y ⇒ y < x
28 in if CmdId(max [1]) < CmdId(c) then 〈c, max [2]〉 else 〈c, max [2] + 1〉
A timestamp fo c greater than or equal to the max of the timstamps xs.
33 GTE (c, xs)
∆
=
34 let max
∆
= choose x ∈ xs : ∀ y ∈ xs : x 6= y ⇒ y < x
35 in if CmdId(max [1]) ≤ CmdId(c) then 〈c, max [2]〉 else 〈c, max [2] + 1〉
37
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